Projected Reactions and Strategic Implications

An analysis of the expected responses to the State of Israel’s “Return 1948” program must consider four key audiences: domestic Israeli society, international organizations (primarily the UN), Western democracies (including the EU, USA, Canada), and the Arab and Muslim world.

Domestic Reaction within Israel

Positive:

• Center-right political forces and moderate policymakers are likely to view the program as a bold and responsible initiative, demonstrating Israel’s commitment to humanitarian values without compromising security or demographics.
• The emphasis that the program is grounded in international law rather than political concessions will resonate with many legal and academic circles.
• The clear limitation of first-generation refugees makes the program acceptable even to many skeptics.

Critical:

• Certain right-wing parties and representatives of the settlement movement may oppose any precedent of Arab return to Israeli territory, however minimal.
• Some fear the program may be a “foot in the door”, eventually leading to renewed demands for the return of descendants.

Verdict:

The program may generate moderate domestic tension, but with effective public communication, it can be received as a sovereign and principled move.

Reaction from International Organizations (UN, UNHCR, UNRWA)

Positive:

• UNHCR (unlike UNRWA) may endorse the program, as it adheres to its own protocols and restores the Palestinian refugee issue to a legal and universal standard.
• The program strengthens Israel’s image as a state governed by the rule of law, which could positively influence international perceptions.

Critical:

• UNRWA will likely oppose the initiative, as its operational model and funding rely on the hereditary definition of refugee status.
• The UN General Assembly may see new critical resolutions initiated by pro-Arab member states, despite the program’s limitation to first-generation individuals.

Verdict:

The program may widen the existing rift between UNHCR and UNRWA, but it also creates an opportunity to reshape international discourse and reset the legal parameters of the “right of return”.

Reaction from Western Countries (EU, USA, Canada, etc.)

Positive:

• The program is likely to be seen as a responsible and constructive step, especially if well-presented through diplomatic channels and public diplomacy.
• The reciprocity-based approach to property restitution and the alignment with Western naturalization standards will work in Israel’s favor.
• The United States and Germany may welcome the legal framework and even adopt it as a precedent for other global conflicts.

Critical:

• Left-leaning parties, human rights organizations, and anti-Israel NGOs may criticize the program on several grounds:
  • Exclusion of descendants;
  • Rejection of the UNRWA definition;
  • Introduction of property reciprocity as a condition.

Verdict:

With active diplomacy, the program can enhance Israel’s image, especially among legal, centrist, and policymaking circles in the West.

Reaction from Arab Countries

Expected Criticism:

• Many Arab states, especially those that have not integrated Palestinian refugees, are likely to claim that the program undermines the right of return and dismantles a core pillar of the Palestinian national position.
• The Palestinian Authority and Hamas will almost certainly reject the program outright, particularly due to the exclusion of descendants and the linkage to Jewish property restitution.
• Countries such as Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, where stateless Palestinians have lived for decades, may face domestic pressure, questioning why Israel is offering a return to anyone while they continue to deny citizenship.

Potential Positives:

• States that have normalized relations with Israel, such as Morocco, the UAE, and Bahrain, may view the program neutrally or even positively, especially if invited to participate in bilateral restitution dialogues.

Verdict:

While official Arab responses may be sharply critical, the program could open a new window for regional dialogue, particularly through quiet, bilateral frameworks.

Strategic and Image-Based Implications

What the program offers Israel:

• A chance to seize the initiative on the refugee issue and shift the conversation to a legal and humanitarian framework.
• An improved international image as a state that offers solutions rather than blocking processes.
• A global legal precedent applicable to other frozen conflicts — portraying Israel as a normative and principled actor.

What the program may trigger:

• A new wave of information warfare by Arab and leftist groups, accusing Israel of “denying justice”.
• Intensified criticism of UNRWA, which may paradoxically benefit long-term discourse reform.
• Renewed domestic political debates, particularly during election cycles.